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Scientific discourses of decent work can be roughly grouped into two main lines of interpretation. 
The first, optimistic line sees the International Labour Organisation’s (ILO) decent work agenda as 
indicative of counter-hegemonic forces successfully injecting post-neo-liberal norms into global 
labour regulation. Specifically, feminist scholars have welcomed the emergence of decent work, 
because of its explicit concern with non-standard work, informal labour and care work. The second, 
more pessimistic line is critical of the decent work agenda, seeing it as compatible with or even 
reinforcing neo-liberal hegemony, especially because of its embrace of soft labour regulation and 
corporate social responsibility. This article aims to analyse the paradoxes of decent work by putting 
this discourse in its historical and theoretical context. The article first draws on the framework of 
Cultural Political Economy (CPE) to identify competing ‘economic imaginaries’ of decent work. 
Two prominent interpretations will be juxtaposed to outline a ‘feminist’ and a ‘business case’ decent 
work imaginary. Second, the article interrogates two different ILO initiatives, each of which is 
underpinned by one of these decent work imaginaries, in terms of the ways they may challenge or 











In 1999, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) adopted ‘decent work’ as the new 
overarching discourse organising its activities in the age of globalisation. This discourse is the result 
of a major revision process within the ILO and it is seen as a response to the challenges of neo-
liberal globalisation in order to strengthen its social dimension (Sengenberger, 2001). Scientific 
discourses of decent work can be roughly grouped into two main lines of interpretation. The first, 
optimistic line sees the ILO’s decent work agenda as indicative of counter-hegemonic forces 
successfully injecting post-neo-liberal norms into global labour regulation. Specifically, feminist 
scholars have welcomed the emergence of decent work, because of its explicit concern with non-
standard work, informal labour and unpaid reproductive work. The second, more pessimistic line is 
critical of the decent work agenda, seeing it as compatible with or even reinforcing neo-liberal 
hegemony, especially because of its embrace of soft labour regulation and corporate social 
responsibility. This article aims to analyse the paradoxes of decent work by taking a closer look at 
the optimistic and the pessimistic decent work imaginaries. Drawing on the theoretical framework of 
Global Labour Journal, 2015, 6(2), Page 138 
Cultural Political Economy (CPE), the article first analyses the emergence of decent work in 
historical context and identifies competing ‘economic imaginaries’ of decent work.2 Two prominent 
interpretations will be juxtaposed to outline a ‘feminist’ and a ‘business case’ decent work imaginary. 
Second, the article interrogates two different ILO initiatives, each of which is underpinned by one of 
these decent work imaginaries, in terms of the ways they may challenge or reinforce neo-liberal 
hegemony – the Domestic Workers Convention and the Better Work Programme. 
 
 
Competing Decent Work Imaginaries 
Scientific discourses on decent work can be clustered around a basic tension between 
optimistic and pessimistic views regarding its progressive potential. The following juxtaposition does 
not represent a full review of the available literature. Rather, two prominent positions are examined 
in order to tease out the paradoxes of decent work.  
An example of the optimistic view is Leah Vosko’s (2002) feminist perspective on decent 
work. Revisiting Robert Cox’s (1977) essay Labor and Hegemony, she agrees with him that the ILO 
was implicated in maintaining hegemonic power relations until the end of the Cold War. Cox (1977: 
389) had argued that a certain form of corporatism had been institutionalised in the ILO’s tripartite 
structure, locking in ‘a form of productive relations, one based on an ideology of non-antagonistic 
relations and on bureaucratized structures of representation and control’. This form of corporatism, 
however, was typical for the Fordist mode of regulation, which was based on national class 
compromises between capital and labour mediated by national welfare states. Corporatist trade 
unions privileged the Fordist ‘standard employment relationship’ – formal, full-time, permanent 
employment with relatively high wages often reserved for white middle-class ‘male breadwinners’ 
(Pfau-Effinger, 2004) – and abandoned both informal, marginalised workers (often female and 
migrant) within the centre and workers in the periphery. In contrast to the hegemonic function the 
ILO fulfilled during the Cold War, Vosko (2002: 20) argues that the emergence of the decent work 
discourse in the era of globalisation reveals ‘a growing counter-hegemonic presence inside the ILO 
and especially at its margins, where transnational coalitions between organized labour, emerging 
labour organizations in the informal sector and NGOs are growing’. For her, decent work is 
underpinned by two rather different, if not contradictory pillars. The first is the ILO’s focus on core 
labour standards, a minimum set of conventions codifying universal labour rights every member 
state must ratify (freedom of association, prohibition of child labour, prohibition of forced labour 
and prohibition of discrimination) as specified in the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work (ILO, 1998). The core labour standards have been criticised from a feminist vantage point for 
encouraging a ‘basically voluntarist approach to labour regulation, severing ILO conventions from 
their principle mechanism of implementation (ratification into domestic law), and endorsing 
business “self-regulation” through things like voluntary codes of conduct’ (Elias, 2007: 47). These 
‘soft law’ tendencies reveal that the core labour standards approach works within and to the benefit 
of what Elias calls the ‘neoliberal development paradigm’ (Elias, 2007: 51).  
The core labour standards, however, are only one of the pillars of the decent work agenda. 
The second pillar, according to Vosko (2002: 20), is the ILO’s new commitment to extending 
existing labour rights and social standards to marginalised groups of workers who have previously 
been excluded from these rights as exemplified by the Convention Concerning Home Work (ILO, 1996). 
Taking the latter as an example, Vosko concludes that instruments aimed to improve working 
conditions and labour rights of marginalised workers represent a victory for counter-hegemonic 
forces within the ILO, but they lack force. Although she acknowledges that this victory may be 
largely symbolic in nature (Vosko, 2002: 33), she agrees with Prugl (1999) that it is pivotal for the 
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global feminist movement, because the ILO for the first time has moved beyond the male standard 
employee of Fordism and addresses the needs of mostly female informal and marginalised workers, 
especially in and from the Global South. Therefore, while the first pillar of decent work potentially 
has the negative effect of reinforcing hegemonic power relations within the ILO, the second pillar, 
according to Vosko (2002), reveals the counter-hegemonic potential of the decent work discourse if 
appropriated by progressive trade unions, women’s groups and other non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). The CPE view adopted here, however, directs attention to the question of 
whether – and if so, how – the symbolic victory of the feminist movement on paper, on the level of 
what can be called a ‘discursive economy of representation’ (Chowdhry, 2004: 233), translates into 
actual improvements of working conditions of women workers on the ground, in the material economy 
of exploitation, or whether it runs the risk of getting tangled up in what Elias (2007: 50) calls a 
‘hegemonic politics of co-option’. In other words, does the decent work agenda’s new concern with 
the informal sector provide the material basis for moving beyond the neo-liberal development 
paradigm? Or does it merely accommodate feminist claims discursively without providing the 
material means to challenge the structures of neo-liberal capitalism, thereby actually serving to 
reinforce neo-liberal hegemony? 
Guy Standing (2008) certainly believes in the latter. He represents the pessimistic view of 
decent work. He laments that decent work has marginalised the traditional ILO regime of industrial 
relations and adversarial bargaining, and interprets its emergence as a sign of organised labour’s 
defeat by neo-liberal hegemony. The Convention Concerning Home Work is a good example for 
contrasting the optimistic with the pessimistic view of decent work. Standing (2008: 366), although 
agreeing that the convention represents an attempt to extend labour rights to marginalised workers 
and that the ILO’s new concern with labour relations beyond the male standard employment 
relationship of Fordism is to be welcomed, calls it ‘a dead letter’, looking at the lack of ratifications 
rather than the standard-setting process itself. Standing, a former ILO official with an insider’s view, 
discusses the role of the ILO in the era of globalisation in historical context. He argues that, while 
the ILO had an important role in the Keynesian regulation of national labour markets during 
Fordism, it has recently struggled to retain this role, because neo-liberal globalisation has 
undermined its foundations. The ILO failed to adequately respond to the neo-liberal imaginary of 
‘supply-side economics’, which originated from the economics departments of the Universities of 
Chicago and Columbia and was quickly taken up by powerful international organisations such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Instead of confronting the structural 
adjustment programmes of these organisations, shock therapy policies in the former Soviet Union, 
and their disastrous effects on labour and social policies worldwide, ‘the ILO did not respond’ 
(Standing, 2008: 363), resulting in a loss of credibility and voice. The subsequent proliferation of 
neo-liberal policies geared towards the flexibilisation of labour markets further gave rise to the 
phenomena typical of the neo-liberal world of work (feminisation, casualisation, informalisation, 
outsourcing, sub-contracting, etc.), further undermining the regulating function of the ILO. After a 
failed attempt to counter this development with a Convention on Contract Labour, the ILO resorted to 
restructuring itself under the Christian Democrat Director-General Michel Hansenne, resulting in 
the 1998 Declaration limiting the body of the international labour code to the above-mentioned core 
labour standards. For Standing, this represents a major setback: 
 
The four core standards enshrined in the Declaration are ‘negative rights’ that lie outside the 
sphere of social or work rights. Banning ‘the worst forms of child labour’, banning ‘forced 
labour’, campaigning against gender discrimination and defending freedom of association are 
matters of common and civil law. They do not constitute a strategy or a progressive agenda 
(Standing, 2008: 367). 
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The 1998 Declaration further weakened the ILO, because it envisages only promotional 
measures to improve implementation of core standards, rather than the possibility of sanctions: ‘Soft 
law was replacing binding law’ (Standing, 2008: 367). Standing (2008: 368) links this development to 
the ILO’s endorsement of emerging forms of private self-regulation such as voluntary codes of 
conduct and corporate social responsibility (CSR), representing ‘a further way by which the 
traditional ILO regime has been marginalized’. The more recent emergence of decent work as the 
overarching theme of the ILO under Director-General Juan Somavia is seen in a similar vein. 
Standing (2008: 370) criticises decent work as a ‘slogan’ and a ‘mantra’ leaving ‘too much room for 
flabby platitudes’ due to its inherent vagueness. The language of ‘social dialogue’, central to the 
decent work discourse, replaced traditional understandings of industrial relations and collective 
bargaining, resulting in a ‘non-confrontational mode that sidelines equality while espousing the 
vagueness of “decency”, “fairness” and “dialogue”’ (Standing, 2008: 371). In this perspective, decent 
work is largely an ethical rhetoric that masks the fact that the ILO lacks the power to substantially 
challenge hegemonic power relations in the era of neo-liberal globalisation.  
In CPE terms, these different views can be conceptualised as competing decent work 
imaginaries – a feminist imaginary stressing its progressive potential for regulating the informal 
economy, and a business case imaginary foregrounding CSR and business self-regulation. The CPE 
perspective helps to understand the vagueness of the decent work agenda, which symbolically 
proclaims the right to decent work for all without providing substantial language as to what decent 
work means in the concrete and how it may be achieved practically. It is exactly this vagueness, the 
big gap between the global discourse and the wide range of (trans-) local practices it may be used to 
justify, that makes decent work an ‘economic imaginary’ (Sum and Jessop, 2013: 182) par excellence. 
Initially, its discursive or semiotic dimension was more important in order to gather support from 
different actors. The symbolic right to decent work for all workers made it an attractive concept for 
trade unions, women’s organisations and other NGOs, while the emphasis on employment creation 
and competitiveness allowed for employers and states to endorse the concept. The vagueness of the 
discourse allows for all stakeholders to subscribe to their own decent work imaginary, while leaving 
open the question of which practical routes are to be taken towards the realisation of decent work. 
 
 
Cultural Political Economy 
A CPE perspective on decent work examines its discursive (or ‘semiotic’) dimensions in 
relation to its material (or ‘structural’) dimensions. The emerging paradigm of CPE as put forward 
by Bob Jessop, Ngai-Ling Sum and others (Jessop, 2004, 2010; Sum 2005, 2006; Jessop and Sum, 
2001, 2010; Sum and Jessop, 2013; Van Heur, 2010) is a macro-theoretical framework inspired by 
Foucault, but retaining key insights of Marx, Gramsci and the regulation approach. CPE is a 
framework under construction combining conceptual perspectives from the regulation approach, 
materialist state theory and critical discourse analysis. It aims at ‘making the cultural turn [within 
political economy] without falling into soft economic sociology’ (Jessop and Oosterlynck, 2008) – 
that is, integrating poststructuralist insights about the constructed and contingent nature of 
knowledge and discourse into an account of political economy that retains a materialist 
understanding of the specific contradictions and crisis tendencies of the capitalist mode of 
production. CPE, therefore, differentiates between semiotic (discursive) and structural (material) 
dimensions of social relations and puts the interplay between the two at the centre of analysis, 
aiming at both the interpretation of discourses and the explanation of causal mechanisms in the ‘real 
world’ (Fairclough, Jessop and Sayer, 2004: 24). The underlying ontology and epistemology of CPE 
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is rooted in critical realism, as was the regulation approach before (Jessop, 2002). CPE, however, 
puts more emphasis on ‘semiosis’ defined as all forms of the social production of meaning. The 
discursive production of meaning is understood as historically contingent but not as free play of 
signs and symbols as more radical approaches to social constructivism would have it. Rather, it has 
to correspond to the material world in an ‘organic’ way in order not to appear as ‘arbitrary, 
rationalistic and willed’ (Jessop, 2010: 345); in other words, it must meaningfully relate to the 
‘decisive economic nucleus’ (Gramsci, 1971) of social relations. Discourses are embedded and 
enacted within specific practices, projects and strategies of particular actors with particular interests, 
rather than being the disembodied circulation of differences without subjective agency. 
CPE is here employed as a heuristics. Rather than fully operationalising the entire theoretical 
framework of CPE, key concepts are adopted that help make sense of the research object under 
investigation. Thus, from the rich oeuvre of CPE, the key concept here is ‘economic imaginary’, 
defined as follows: ‘An economic imaginary is a semiotic order … and, as such, constitutes the 
semiotic moment of a network of social practices in a given social field, institutional order, or wider 
social formation’ (Jessop and Oosterlynck, 2008: 1157–1158). 
Initially, economic imaginaries are primarily semiotic in nature but, depending on social 
balances of power and constellations of interests, may be gradually institutionalised, embodied and 
sedimented into more material forms. CPE differentiates the evolutionary moments of variation, 
selection and retention to analyse the development of economic imaginaries. In the moment of 
variation, economic imaginaries – in this case competing conceptions of decent work – are initially 
circulating relatively freely. Only some of these pass the moment of selection, which is based on 
strategic selectivities (Sum and Jessop, 2013: 214–219). Through the moment of retention, economic 
imaginaries may become hegemonic, discursively reinforced and eventually materially sedimented 
and institutionalised to consolidate new forms of social praxis. This process, however, is never fully 
complete. Economic imaginaries are rather ‘only ever partially constituted. There are always 
interstitial, residual, marginal, irrelevant, recalcitrant and plain contradictory elements that escape any 
attempt to identify, govern, and stabilise a given economic arrangement or broader economic order’ 
(Jessop, 2004: 163). The partiality and incompleteness of economic imaginaries also means that there 
is always space for contestation, appropriation or resistance as a fourth moment of the evolutionary 
process, however marginal, so that sub- or counter-hegemonic discourses may emerge from a variety 
of scales. These spaces for potential resistance or counter-hegemony depend partly on ‘the gaps 
between discourses and practices’ (Sum, 2006: 20). 
When analysing the evolution of economic imaginaries, CPE looks at hegemonic, sub- and 
counter-hegemonic actors involved in their variation, selection and retention or contestation. Ngai-
Ling Sum (2005, 2006) unravels the relationships among hegemony, sub- and counter-hegemony, 
referring to neo-liberalism as a hegemonic project. The hegemonic codes of neo-liberalism include 
discourses of competitiveness, privatisation, deregulation and free trade. Key actors (‘organic 
intellectuals’ in Gramsci’s sense) promoting these codes are to be found within international 
organisations such as the IMF, the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), as well 
as on the different levels of states and governments (national states, supra-national states such as the 
European Union, local governments). However, in line with Gramsci, hegemony needs to be 
secured within the (transnational) civil society, which is why non-state actors such as transnational 
corporations, think tanks, consultancy firms, rating agencies, NGOs, trade unions and so forth play 
a crucial role. So, hegemonic discourses emerge from a variety of local to global scales and from 
three ‘mediating arenas’: international organisations, states and civil society (Sum, 2006: 11). But 
from these scales and arenas, sub- and counter-hegemonic discourses may emerge as well. The ILO, 
for instance, due to its tripartite structure, while not in opposition to international competition and 
free trade per se, aims to strengthen the ‘social dimension of globalization’ (ILO, 2008) which extends 
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the hegemonic meaning of globalisation but ‘can be subsumed and contained within the hegemonic 
codes’ (Sum, 2005), making the ILO a site for both hegemonic actors (powerful member states, 
employer organisations) and sub-hegemonic actors (other member states, trade unions). Sub-
hegemonic discourses and practices ‘may strengthen the overall consensus around the hegemonic 
project’ (Sum, 2006: 21) when they become appropriated by hegemonic actors and absorbed into 
hegemonic discourses. Typical sub-hegemonic actors include service-oriented NGOs providing 
social services that, while in many cases motivated by humanistic ideals or similar non-market 
oriented imaginaries, effectively strengthen market rule by serving as ‘flanking mechanisms’ (Graefe, 
2006) for the neo-liberalised market regime. Lastly, counter-hegemonic discourses and practices can 
be defined as those which contribute to the articulation of a counter-hegemonic project that cannot 
be subsumed and absorbed into the hegemonic project. Typical counter-hegemonic actors include a 
huge variety of social movements and movement-oriented NGOs, certain types of trade unions or 
echelons within them, critical intellectuals and producers of counter-culture. These actors operate 
within their respective local settings as well as on global and regional scales in arenas and networks 
such as the World and regional Social Forums.  
 
 
The Emergence of the Decent Work Discourse 
CPE, as inspired by Foucault, looks at the historical moment in which a new discourse, such 
as decent work, emerges and traces its development back to what came before. This ‘genealogical’ 
method does not aim to determine the ‘origin’ of the decent work discourse, but rather to investigate 
what enabled its ‘emergence’ (McNay, 1994: 89). Embedding this genealogy into the CPE 
framework, with its links to regulation theory, means to look at the conditions of emergence in 
terms of the different periods of capitalist development, different regimes of accumulation and 
different modes of regulation. This section briefly outlines the historical development of global 
labour regulation and situates it within the history of capitalist development in general, thereby 
contextualising the emergence of decent work historically and theoretically. 
 
Fordism and the Periphery 
Fordism – the period of capitalist development from the end of World War II until the world 
economic crisis of the 1970s – rested on the successful articulation of mass production and mass 
consumption. The Fordist regime of accumulation was one of ‘intensive accumulation with growing 
mass consumption’ (Lipietz, 1988: 23); that is, accumulation rested on growth in productivity and 
corresponding growth in effective demand. The Fordist mode of regulation regulated the wage 
relation in such a way that the basic contradiction between wages as costs of production and wages 
as sources of demand was temporarily resolved by tying wage increases to growth in productivity. 
The Fordist wage relation represented an institutionalised compromise between capital and labour 
within national economies, forged by labour unions and business associations and mediated by the 
Keynesian welfare state, stabilising mass consumption and thus capital accumulation (Hirsch, 1995: 
78). 
The familiar account of Fordism as mass production plus mass consumption mediated by the 
welfare state carries a strong bias towards Western Europe and Northern America. Within countries 
of the Global South, Fordism showed a different face, because they were integrated into the 
‘international regime’ (Boyer, 1990: 40) on unequal terms. Within the ‘old [international] division of 
labour’ (Lipietz, 1987: 47), the rich countries of the North primarily imported agricultural goods and 
raw materials from poor countries of the South to be used in industrial production for the domestic 
market. They were dependent on international exchange, but the dynamic of accumulation primarily 
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rested on domestic demand bolstered by the welfare state. A smaller portion of finished goods was 
exported back to developing countries, which tried to emulate the Northern model by launching 
programmes of ‘import substitution industrialisation’ (Novy, Parnreiter and Fischer, 1999: 13). The 
emerging crisis of central Fordism, however, shifted the international division of labour as capital 
started to search for cheap labour in developing countries in the 1970s. The Fordist labour process 
was reorganised into a ‘new, vertical division of labour between levels of skill inside branches of 
industry’ (Lipietz, 1987: 71). Labour-intensive tasks defined as ‘unskilled’ were relocated to low-wage 
countries in the periphery as a major strategy to overcome the profitability crisis of Fordism, 
resulting in the emergence of ‘global commodity chains’ (Gereffi, 1994) and the replacement of 
import substitution with export orientation. 
 
Globalisation and Feminisation Of Labour 
Since the 1980s, the processes of internationalisation, liberalisation and deregulation have been 
discussed under the heading of neo-liberal globalisation. Globalisation is often understood as a 
process fuelled by technological and financial innovations. Although true in some sense, Silvia 
Federici points out that from a labour perspective another aspect is more important:  
 
In my view, the technological and financial revolution that has accompanied the globalisation 
process and enabled it in some respects is less significant than the ability of capital to cut the 
cost of labour by massively expanding the world labour market (Federici, 2012: 52–53, my 
translation). 
 
The crucial factors, according to her, are ‘the increase in numbers of workers available for 
exploitation, the disciplining of these workers and the cut in labour costs’ (Federici, 2012: 53, my 
translation). She identifies two major mechanisms by which the world population available for wage 
labour has been increased: continuous ‘primitive accumulation’ through a new round of global 
enclosures driving people off their customary lands and forests, depriving them of their means of 
subsistence and forcing them to look for wage labour on plantations or in the cities, and increased 
employment of women who have previously been excluded from the realm of wage labour (Federici, 
2014: 94).3 
The ‘feminisation of labour’ (Ruppert, 2001) is thus an integral part of globalisation, seen as 
the major strategy of capital to resolve the profitability crisis of Fordism. Usually, feminisation of 
labour is understood to grasp two different, though interrelated processes: the increase in female 
labour market participation and the proliferation of precarious, ‘flexible’ labour relations and 
insecure working conditions, previously seen as typically female, for both men and women 
(Standing, 1989, 1999). As import substitution came more and more to be seen as a failure, it was 
increasingly replaced by, or rather rearticulated with, the strategy of ‘export-oriented 
industrialisation’(Gereffi, 1994: 100). In regulationist terms, the main logic of this accumulation 
strategy has been called ‘primitive’ or ‘bloody Taylorization’ (Lipietz, 1987: 74), referring to the 
relocation of labour-intensive industries such as garments, textiles and consumer electronics to 
countries or regions with very low wages, long working hours and bad conditions, especially in 
‘export processing zones’ in countries of the Global South designed to attract foreign capital 
through legal incentives (tax breaks, exemptions from customs, restrictions of labour rights and so 
on). It is in these export-oriented industries that young women were especially targeted to recruit a 
cheap, seemingly docile and acquiescent labour force – an expectation these women were soon to 
prove wrong when they started to organise collectively for their interests (Salzinger, 2004). 
Emerging global commodity chains came to be dominated by transnational corporations 
(TNCs). Export countries are competing over the most favourable conditions for foreign direct 
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investment by TNCs. Since low wages and weak social (as well as environmental) standards are the 
only ‘comparative advantage’ of most countries of the Global South, competition between them 
resulted in the ‘race to the bottom’ (Ehmke, Simon and Simon, 2009: 26). In trying to attract foreign 
capital, labour markets were increasingly restructured according to the neo-liberal dogma of 
‘flexibility’, thereby eroding labour standards and working conditions.  
Transnational supply chains are highly complex.4 Hurley and Miller (2005) use the metaphor 
of an iceberg to depict the intricate web of contracting, subcontracting and sub-subcontracting in 
the global garment industry. The tip of the iceberg is the lead firm, in most cases a global retailer 
such as Walmart or a merchandiser of branded goods such as Nike and Adidas. They place orders 
with multinational manufacturers (Tier 1), themselves often large TNCs, which in turn subcontract 
parts of the production process to medium (Tier 2) and small manufacturers (Tier 3) to meet short 
turnaround times or the low prices dictated by the lead firm. Sub-subcontracting goes down to the 
level of home workers, the most precarious, informal and feminised segment of the supply chain. 
Above the waterline and thus visible is only the relationship between buyer and Tier 1 manufacturer 
(Hurley and Miller, 2005: 23). The subcontracting networks below the waterline are more invisible, 
making it hard for anyone to trace the production process and to monitor working conditions, but 
making it easy for TNCs to shift the responsibility for bad working conditions and labour rights 
abuses on to their subcontractors. Downward pressure on turnaround times and prices increases 
further down the supply chain, ‘bringing associated problems of excessive overtime and sub-
minimum wages’ (Hurley and Miller, 2005: 26). Stephanie Barrientos’ (2007: 244) ‘gendered 
employment pyramid’ further explains that beneath the level of paid home work there is an even 
larger background of unpaid domestic and care (‘reproductive’) work largely performed by women, 
upon which global production systems are built.  
Globalisation has also restructured the ‘care economy’ (Chorus, 2013) in profound ways. 
Rising labour market participation of women in Northern countries has not led to a more equal 
redistribution of care work between women and men as many hoped for. Rather, ‘social 
reproduction’ continues to be seen as a women’s task, despite their full integration into the 
‘productive’ economy of capitalist wage labour. On the discursive level, gender regimes have been 
modernised to depict men and women as equals, one of the successes of the feminist movement. 
On the material level, however, gendered divisions of labour persist and continue to reproduce 
gender hierarchies. This contradictory process has been called the ‘rhetorical modernisation’ 
(Wetterer, 2003) of gender regimes. The practical solution to the reproduction problem in many 
cases has been the commodification of care work and its delegation to ethnically other women – 
migrant women workers without or with limited citizenship rights acting as ‘new maids’ (Lutz, 2001) 
in middle-class households of rich countries. As a result, globalisation leads to the emergence of 
global ‘care chains’ (Lutz, 2005) as the hidden counterpart of global commodity chains. 
 
Global Labour Regulation 
As mentioned before, these processes of global restructuring have altered the terrain of global 
labour regulation in every respect. The Fordist development paradigm based on Keynesianism and 
national welfare statism has been replaced by the neo-liberal development paradigm based on 
supply-side economics and international competition statism (Hirsch, 2005: 145). It is in this context 
that the discourse on decent work has emerged. In the period immediately preceding the emergence 
of decent work, discussions about how to best prevent downward harmonisation of labour rights 
and social standards within transnational supply chains centred around the idea of a ‘social clause’ 
within the regime of the WTO, linking labour standards to trade agreements and allowing for trade 
sanctions against states that would fail to comply with minimum standards.  
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Whereas scholars, activists and unionists from the Global North have tended to stress the 
progressive potential of a multilateral social clause (Scherrer and Greven, 2001: 128), postcolonial 
and feminist scholars have argued that social clauses may actually be counterproductive with regard 
to protecting the most vulnerable workers at the bottom of transnational supply chains. Naila 
Kabeer (2004), for instance, argues that the enforcement of labour rights through trade sanctions 
may not only lead to declining employment in export industries but, more importantly, to the 
transfer of jobs from the formal to the informal economy, where women are concentrated and 
working conditions are far worse. The Western gaze tends to victimise ‘Third World women’ 
(Kabeer, 2004: 10) working in ‘sweatshop’ export factories, and neglect the positive aspects of 
formal factory work in comparison with available alternatives in the informal economy. Kabeer 
(2004: 4) maintains that women workers, trade unions and NGOs in the Global South have resisted 
the idea that social clauses will serve their interests, but other stakeholders have resisted the social 
clause proposal as well. First of all, neo-liberal economists and TNCs from around the globe have 
rejected it because it contradicts the ideology of free markets and free trade. Second, governments of 
developing countries have criticised it for basically serving protectionist interests of the North vis-à-
vis their low-cost competitors from the South (Kabeer, 2004: 8; Vosko, 2002: 22).  
Given the widespread opposition against the social clause from a coalition of diverse actors, 
the attempt to implement a social clause within the WTO regime ultimately failed. As a result, the 
matter of global labour regulation was referred back to the ILO at a time when the organisation 
struggled to retain relevancy in the age of globalisation, as Standing (2008) argues. The impasse at 
the WTO ‘fuelled the adoption of the ILO’s [1998] Social Declaration, whose form resembles a 
social clause yet it is not attached to trade’ (Vosko, 2002: 22, emphasis in the original). Instead of 
championing a binding regime of ‘hard law’ labour regulation linked to trade sanctions, the ILO 
moved away from the Fordist ‘ratification model’ (Elias, 2007: 51) and resorted to a neo-liberal 
model of ‘soft law’ labour regulation based on voluntariness and promotional measures. In line with 
the UN’s Global Compact, the ILO began to embrace voluntary codes of conduct and CSR policies 
despite the fact that these have been widely criticised for failing to deliver on the promise of 
improving working conditions. The ILO tried to improve their effectiveness by promoting its core 
labour standards as the general frame of reference for minimum standards to be implemented in 
company codes. 
This is the historical context out of which the decent work discourse emerged. The 1998 
Declaration laid the groundwork by codifying the core labour standards that have been criticised for 
being compatible with the neo-liberal development paradigm (Elias, 2007; Standing, 2008) and for 
reinforcing hegemonic power relations within the ILO (Vosko, 2002). The Declaration on Social Justice 
for a Fair Globalization (ILO, 2008) further specified the decent work agenda. It was now defined as 
consisting of four pillars: employment creation, social protection, social dialogue and fundamental 
principles and rights at work. The ILO is a tripartite organisation and, as such, represents a specific 
configuration of relations of forces that become inscribed into its agenda. Decent work can be seen 
as a compromise or a  
 
skilful effort at mediating escalating tensions inside the ILO between global capital, backed by 
a majority of industrialized states, and an increasingly vocal group of member states, trade 
unions, women’s organizations and other NGOs concerned with improving the lives of 
marginalized workers (Vosko, 2002: 20). 
 
It is thus not surprising that decent work is a discourse that is attractive to both workers and 
employers, because each have injected their own imaginary of what decent work should mean into 
the agenda. For employers and most states, the objective of employment creation allows for 
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continuing with neo-liberal supply-side economics and policies of competitiveness. The notion of 
social dialogue replaces adversarial bargaining, as Standing (2008) notes, and thus works in the 
interest of global capital to minimise industrial action and labour unrest. Fundamental labour rights 
– as universal human rights rather than appendices of international trade agreements – and social 
protection, on the other hand, can be seen as concessions to trade unions and poor countries. The 
question is whether or not the decent work agenda has the potential to move beyond the neo-liberal 
development paradigm, or whether it serves to reinforce neo-liberal hegemony by accommodating 
criticisms of neo-liberalism discursively without providing the material means to actually change 
neo-liberal production processes. 
 
 
The Potentials and Limitations of Decent Work 
Kabeer (2004) is careful to argue that her scepticism of global labour standards in trade 
agreements – informed by postcolonial and feminist theory – is different from the neo-liberals’ 
stance against regulation in that it is not founded on the belief in the self-regulating capacities of free 
markets. On the contrary, she argues that the ‘struggle for labor standards needs to be broadened 
and made more inclusive by transforming itself into a struggle for a universal “social floor”’ (Kabeer, 
2004: 28) in order for all workers to be able to struggle for better working conditions without being 
afraid of losing their jobs or having to enter into the informal labour market for new or alternative 
employment. Similarly, Barrientos (2007: 251) views decent work in general and social protection in 
particular as providing ‘the basis for a more holistic approach to enhancing workers’ rights in global 
production’ vis-à-vis the narrow focus on social clauses and codes of conduct. The progressive 
potential of decent work is largely seen in the rhetorical inclusion of informal workers, especially 
women workers, and in the social protection pillar that – if put into material practice – would better 
cater to the needs of women who are forced to flexibly switch between paid home work for global 
production and unpaid housework for their families (Barrientos, 2007: 243). The ILO had long 
ignored the feminist discourse on social reproduction, but the decent work agenda seems to change 
this by addressing all forms of work, whether paid or unpaid, whether male or female, whether 
permanent or temporary – at least rhetorically. 
The question, again, is whether this symbolic success of feminism in the discursive economy 
of representation translates into material improvements of actual working and living conditions. In 
CPE terms, does the feminist decent work imaginary have the potential to become counter-
hegemonic vis-à-vis neo-liberalism, or does it remain sub-hegemonic in that it ‘can be subsumed and 
contained within the hegemonic codes’ (Sum, 2005) of neo-liberalism? Answering this question 
would require careful empirical analyses of concrete cases in terms of how decent work imaginaries 
materialise to constitute new forms of labour praxis in particular contexts. This goes beyond the 
scope of this article. Some preliminary remarks on possible sites for future research on decent work 
may however be appropriate.  
Next, two ILO initiatives will be explored, each of which is underpinned by either the feminist 
or the business case imaginary, in terms of the ways they may challenge or reinforce neo-liberal 
hegemony – the Domestic Workers Convention and the Better Work Programme. 
 
Decent Work for Domestic Workers 
Female migrant domestic workers are among the most marginalised, informal and precarious 
workers in the global economy. In many countries, they are not only explicitly excluded from 
national labour law; they also suffer from low wages and long working hours and do not enjoy any 
form of social protection (Schwenken, 2012). Although horror stories about slave-like conditions in 
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countries such as Saudi Arabia abound, their struggle for decent work shows that these women are 
not faceless victims of globalisation, but workers who organise collectively to fight for their rights. 
Three years of intense campaigning by organised domestic workers have resulted in the adoption of 
the ILO’s (2011) Convention Concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers in 2011, entering force in 
2013.  
Helen Schwenken (2012) argues that the Domestic Workers Convention is a major step 
forward in terms of recognising the rights of domestic workers as workers and making visible their 
hidden labour. The intense campaign preceding the adoption of the convention was unique in that it 
was carried out by domestic workers’ organisations themselves in coalition with trade union 
federations. Successful cooperation of formal trade unions and more informal organisations and 
networks in this case is a practical example for the progressive potential of decent work as suggested 
by Vosko (2002). The decent work agenda clearly enabled domestic workers to fight for the 
recognition of their rights as workers and the convention extends existing labour rights to this 
previously excluded group of informal workers. The feminist decent work imaginary here passed the 
moment of variation and became selected within the standard-setting procedure of the ILO. Within 
the discursive economy of representation, domestic workers now enjoy the same rights as other 
workers. However, the question remains whether this feminist victory on legal territory translates 
into new forms of material practices on the ground. In other words, does the imaginary have enough 
powerful backing to become further materialised or institutionalised in the ‘actually existing 
economy’ (Sum and Jessop, 2013: 166) of global care chains? 
Schwenken (2012) is cautiously optimistic about the convention and sees its progressive 
potential largely in the ways it has enabled discussions about the informal economy, labour 
migration and gender relations within the ILO – topics that have long been ignored but that become 
more and more important under globalisation. She is, however, less optimistic about the 
convention’s power to substantially challenge the structural conditions governing the field of 
transnational domestic work, that is, neo-liberal gender, migration and labour regimes. The 
instrument of an ILO convention is largely semiotic in nature and does not in and of itself have the 
power to challenge the neo-liberal development paradigm. The conditions for domestic workers to 
organise and fight for concrete improvements on the ground are nevertheless improved. If and how 
domestic workers will be able to make use of these new opportunities is an empirical question that 
depends on local balances of power and conjunctures of social struggles in particular contexts. 
 
The Better Work Programme 
The global Better Work Programme is a typical example of the kinds of initiatives the ILO is 
carrying out in the area of CSR under the umbrella of decent work. It was initiated in Cambodia as 
the Better Factories Programme as an attempt to help the Cambodian garment industry to secure 
orders following the phase-out of the Multi-Fibre Agreement in 2005. After the Cambodian 
experience had been reported as a success story benefitting both employers and workers 
(Ferenschild, 2011), Better Work was exported to other countries such as Indonesia, Vietnam, 
Lesotho, Jordan, Haiti and Nicaragua. Better Work is a partnership of the ILO and the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) and, as such, an example of the new approach of the ILO to seek ‘soft 
money from international agencies’ (Standing, 2008: 381) to make up for decreased regular budget 
funding. The problem with this soft money is that the ILO becomes dependent on external donors 
and its programmes become donor-driven. The IFC is part of the World Bank Group and has the 
mandate to promote private-sector development in developing countries. It is not known for its 
stance against the neo-liberal development paradigm or its concern for marginalised workers. The 
joint venture of the ILO and the IFC, therefore, further exacerbates the contradictions within the 
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decent work discourse. Better Work makes the ‘business case’ for decent work while maintaining 
that workers will benefit simultaneously.  
Better Work aims to improve both company compliance with core labour standards and 
industry competitiveness in transnational supply chains, focusing on the global garment and textile 
industry. It offers technical services to both global buyers and local suppliers of garments and 
textiles in terms of quality assurance, monitoring and evaluation, as well as impact assessment. The 
idea is a classic win-win situation: Participation in Better Work would give the garment companies a 
competitive advantage in the global market because CSR management, auditing and certification are 
now integral parts of transnational supply chains. The workers, of course, would benefit from better 
working conditions through improved company compliance. Benefits for garment factories in the 
Global South are primarily seen in helping them to secure contract relationships with international 
buyers such as major sports brands like Nike and Adidas. The demands by these buyers to comply 
with their respective codes of conduct or CSR policy are thus the main motivation for the suppliers 
to participate in Better Work. It is the first major monitoring project of the ILO and, as such, 
replaces private auditing and monitoring schemes in participating factories. It thus serves to reduce 
auditing costs for employers while improving the credibility of their codes of conduct and CSR 
mechanisms. 
The track record of Better Work from a worker’s perspective is ambiguous. On the one hand, 
some improvements of the working conditions in participating factories have been recorded 
(Ferenschild, 2011; Merk, 2012), especially in the area of occupational safety and health. On the 
other hand, Better Work adopts a very technical understanding of labour rights and social standards 
that obscures some important political problems with decent work. For example, assessing wages 
only against the legal minimum wage is not sufficient to measure decent work as the minimum wage 
in many countries is still below subsistence level. Here, the limitation of the decent work agenda of 
not including ‘the right to earn a living wage – something that was included in Article 23 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (Elias, 2007: 52) – is an obvious problem. The ILO has 
shied away from addressing the living wage issue, presumably because it is very controversial and 
likely to undermine the harmonious notion of ‘social dialogue’ if it was pursued. Companies can only 
afford to pay wages below subsistence level because they can rely on unpaid domestic, care and 
subsistence work, mostly performed by women. The lower the wage in the factory, the stronger is 
the compulsion to work extra hours on rice paddies, as street vendors and in kitchens. As long as 
decent work in general and Better Work in particular does not address this issue head-on, the 
positive effects for women’s double shifts are likely to be limited. This lends credibility to Standing’s 
pessimistic view. 
If the optimistic view is right with respect to informal and marginalised workers, decent work 
must effectively contribute to extending labour rights down the supply chains through to the level of 
home work. Better Work, unsurprisingly, only addresses Tier 1 factories with direct contract 
relationships to transnational buyers; that is, it replicates the limitations of other instruments of 
global labour regulation in that it does not have the capacity to effect change in actual labour 
practices further down the supply chain (Ferenschild, 2011). Home workers remain below the 
waterline and thus invisible to the Better Work Programme. Subcontracted factories and factories 
that do not produce for export are not covered (Merk, 2012: 19). 
Therefore, while Better Work helps buyers and suppliers in very material ways with 
monitoring their CSR strategies as part of transnational supply chain management, the discursive 
recognition of workers’ rights does not translate easily into actual improvements on the ground. In 
CPE terms, while both the feminist and the business case imaginary of decent work are present on 
the semiotic level (variation), the business case imaginary is more powerful and thus more likely to 
become selected and retained in material practices. The driving force behind Better Work is not so 
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much realising labour rights as human rights or fulfilling workers’ demands for better working 
conditions as it is the growing demand for social auditing and certification schemes within 




Decent work emerged in the context of neo-liberal globalisation, which itself marks the 
transition from Fordism to neo-liberalism. The societal problem arising in this context that decent 
work responds to is two-fold. On the one hand, decent work responds to the problem of indecent 
working conditions, poverty wages and social insecurity. Globalisation has led to increasingly 
informal and precarious employment, and decent work is ostensibly designed to rectify this problem 
by introducing new labour policies. This discourse strand can be found in hegemonic sites (mainly 
the ILO and associated governments and business associations) as well as some sub-hegemonic sites 
(e.g. service-oriented NGOs and business unions). On the other hand, decent work responds to a 
problem of legitimation in the current conjuncture of global capitalism. Social movements have 
contributed to a crisis of legitimacy by challenging the hegemony of neo-liberal globalisation, 
criticising TNCs for sweatshop conditions in their factories and raising public awareness about 
labour and human rights violations. Decent work responds to this legitimation problem by 
symbolically proclaiming the right to decent work for all without challenging the structural 
mechanisms causing indecent working conditions in the first place. This discourse strand is mainly 
to be found in counter-hegemonic sites (e.g. movement-oriented NGOs and social movement 
unions). Some sub-hegemonic actors may also occupy a third space in between the two general lines 
and navigate between acknowledging the legitimatising function of decent work and seizing the 
opportunities for incremental change arising therefrom (e.g. development NGOs and social 
democratic unions). 
We can thus conclude that the decent work discourse is a contradictory ensemble of 
competing economic imaginaries. The feminist decent work imaginary as exemplified by the 
Domestic Workers Convention, on the one hand, challenges neo-liberal codes by discursively 
extending labour rights to new groups of marginalised and informal, mostly female workers. On the 
other hand, its material power to substantially challenge the social structures of neo-liberal 
production, giving rise to informalisation, casualisation and marginalisation in the first place, is 
limited. Thus, the feminist imaginary may be conceptualised as counter-hegemonic vis-à-vis neo-
liberalism on the discursive level. Taking into account Sum’s differentiation of sub- and counter-
hegemony, however, it may also be conceptualised as a sub-hegemonic discourse that extends the 
meaning of notions such as ‘labour’ or ‘worker’ to formerly excluded parts of the working 
population, recognises their labour rights – at least discursively – but fails to provide the material 
basis for effectively moving beyond the neo-liberal development paradigm. Whether it serves as a 
‘flanking mechanism’ (Graefe, 2006) for neo-liberalism or whether it becomes further appropriated 
by progressive actors to challenge neo-liberal practices materially, remains to be seen. 
The business case decent work imaginary as exemplified by the Better Work Programme 
reinforces the hegemonic codes of neo-liberalism by espousing competitiveness and voluntary CSR 
as part of transnational supply chain management. It represents a minimum standard approach to 
decent work that primarily serves to ‘re-ethicalise’ neo-liberal production, that is, to fulfil global 
capital’s need for cheap but ethical labour. This need is now a general feature of the current ‘latest 
round of roll-out neo-liberalism’ (Sum, 2010) as a result of anti-sweatshop campaigns and public 
criticism staged by labour unions and social movements. Decent work, here, can be conceptualised 
as part of Sum’s (2010) ‘new ethicalism’ reconnecting neo-liberal production practices to moral 
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values without substantially challenging underlying power relations, thus reinforcing neo-liberal 
hegemony by co-opting criticism rather than transcending neo-liberalism. New ethicalism is a 
‘technology of control in which the audit and certification discourses, practices and procedures are 
used to ward off dangers and gain mastery over social activism’ (Sum, 2010: 65). This corresponds to 
Franco Barchiesi’s (2012: 135) argument about decent work as ‘an antidote to radical demands’ 
holding in a ‘material reality where work is a condition of dignity and decency for a shrinking 
minority of the population’. Depending on the specific actors and their projects making use of 
decent work in different contexts, decent work imaginaries may thus be both sub-hegemonic in 
helping neo-liberalism to adapt and reproduce its hegemony and counter-hegemonic in supporting 
marginalised workers to combat marginalisation and reclaim dignity. If the latter shall be referred to 
unequivocally, perhaps the notion of ‘dignified labour’ is a better term.5 
In CPE terms, economic imaginaries are understood as addressing or processing fundamental 
contradictions based in the social forms of capitalism. Looking at decent work in these terms also 
means asking about the contradictions it addresses and the ways in which these are contained within 
the imaginary, albeit necessarily partially and temporarily. Therefore, it also means being attentive to 
how these contradictions may escape containment and resurface as conflicts and crises. Obviously, 
this entails reflecting on the basic contradiction between capital and labour, how it is being regulated 
in the wage relation, how decent work imaginaries are addressing it and how recurring labour 
conflicts continually demonstrate that this fundamental contradiction of capitalism cannot easily be 
contained. After all, the right to decent work appears as that ‘which we cannot not want’ (Brown, 
2000: 231) – we cannot not want poor working conditions to be improved, no matter how slow and 
incremental. However, we must also ask whether such improvements empower workers to 
collectively organise for their interests and actively fight for further societal change or whether they 
may serve as a ‘passive revolution’ (Gramsci, 1971) to flank neo-liberalism and pre-empt, 
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2.  The notion of ‘economic imaginaries’ will be explained in the section on CPE. 
3.  An example from Indonesia for the first mechanism is the palm oil industry. Primary forests 
are slashed and burned to make way for palm oil plantations; indigenous people are driven off 
their land and turned into day labourers working on the plantations (Humanity United, n.d.). 
Although this is an important aspect of the making of the Indonesian working class, I here 
focus on the second mechanism involving the feminisation of labour. 
4.  The concept of ‘transnational supply chains’ (Hurley and Miller, 2005) builds on Gerreffi’s 
(1994) ‘global commodity chains’ but explicitly incorporates the informalised and feminised 
segment of home work at the bottom end of the apparel supply chain. 
5.  A Thai cooperative producing clothing in a factory under workers’ control that is a member of 
the transnational No Chains network calls itself Dignity Returns and promotes its products as 
‘Sweat-Free Products of Dignified Labor’ (http://www.dignityreturns.org). The notion of 
‘dignified labour’ here represents a counter-hegemonic alternative to ‘decent work’. 
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